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ABSTRACT 
 
We find evidence for asymmetric behaviour in Australian monetary policy. 
During 1984-1990, the Reserve Bank of Australia acted with considerable 
discretion yielding poor performance of an interest rate rule. However it 
behaved asymmetrically to inflation and the output gap in downturns and 
upturns. On embracing inflation targeting from 1991, it enhanced its 
credibility by anchoring inflation expectations. Not only did its actions 
become more predictable in 1991-2002, it responded asymmetrically only to 
output, switching to act more acutely in downturns. While its asymmetric 
behaviour could result from asymmetric preferences or non-linear aggregate 
supply, our results support the former explanation. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
For countries that have floating exchange rates and free capital mobility, 
monetary policy has come to play an increasingly vital role in the stabilization of 
the economy. Though monetary policy instruments can affect a wide range of 
macroeconomic variables, attention is usually focused on a measure of aggregate 
output and the rate of inflation. Taylor (1993) proposed a simple symmetric 
monetary policy rule whereby the monetary authority adjusts the short-term 
interest rate—the ubiquitous monetary policy instrument—to respond to 
observed inflation and output fluctuations in the economy. This feedback rule 
was shown to fit the Federal Reserve’s interest rate setting behaviour remarkably 
well for the period between 1987 and 1997 (see Taylor (1999a)). The ability of 
this simple monetary policy rule to capture an inherently complex decision-
making process is appealing, and has prompted much research. 
 Monetary policymaking, however, is forward-looking by nature due to 
long and variable policy lags. Monetary authorities utilize forecasts of future 
economic conditions to formulate policy actions in the present. Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) extended the baseline Taylor specification with 
the monetary authority assumed to adjust the short-term interest rate in 
response to expected future inflation deviations from its target value and current 
output deviations from its trend value. In both the backward-looking and 
forward-looking specifications, the implication is that the monetary authority 
responds with symmetrical intensity to positive and negative deviations in 
inflation and/or output in relation to their respective target values. 
 Several papers have provided explicit micro-foundations to derive the 
symmetric monetary policy rule—for example, Svensson (1997, 1999), 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Given 
the optimizing behaviour of the monetary authority, the preferences of policy-
makers are usually approximated by a quadratic loss function of deviations of 
inflation from its target value and output from its trend value (for example, see 
equation (2.7) in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), p.1668). When the quadratic 
function is combined with a linear aggregate supply relation (or a Phillips curve), 
the first-order result of minimizing the loss function yields a linear symmetric 
monetary policy rule. The ultimate policy goal is to maximize the welfare of the 
society, but this does not necessarily imply that the monetary authority should 
deem positive inflation and output gaps as unpalatable as the negative ones. 
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 Extending the influential inflation bias framework propounded by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), Cukierman (2000) 
developed an environment where the monetary authority is uncertain about the 
state of the economy and displays greater aversion to under- than over-
employment. He showed that the monetary authority may respond relatively 
more aggressively to negative output gaps generated by an adverse supply shock 
than positive output gaps generated by a favourable supply shock of the same 
magnitude. In addition, the monetary authority is assumed to attract more 
criticism when pre-emptively contracting the economy to reduce inflation 
compared with stimulating the economy to reduce unemployment. These 
possibilities imply that the monetary authority possesses an asymmetric 
preference function. Gerlach (2000), Bec, Salem and Collard (2002) and Ruge-
Murcia (2002, 2004) provided evidence that central banks in different countries 
exhibit asymmetric behaviour. While this observed asymmetric behaviour may 
be explained by asymmetric preferences, Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira 
(2005) have shown that it may also arise from a non-linear aggregate supply 
relation. There is other recent evidence that suggests a convex relationship 
between inflation and output (see Debelle and Laxton (1997), Debelle and 
Vickery (1998)). 
 This paper tests for the presence of asymmetric policymaking behaviour 
by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in the post-float era after 1983. We 
examine whether the RBA reacted differently to future expected inflation and 
output gaps during the expansionary and contractionary phases of the business 
cycle. Following de Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) who identified 1991 as a point 
of policy break due to the implementation of inflation targeting, we split our 
sample then to see if there is a difference in the asymmetry of monetary policy 
before and after the inception inflation targeting.1 For each of the two periods, 
we estimate and test for evidence that the RBA behaved asymmetrically across 
the two states of the business cycle. If the evidence favours asymmetry, we ask 
the following questions: Did the RBA view the future expected deviations in 
inflation and/or output gaps from the target values to be more costly during 
expansions than contractions, or vice versa? Did the introduction of an explicit 
inflation target range restore symmetry in the response of the RBA to inflation?  
Did it change the intensity of its response to output gaps in downturns relative 
to upturns? What was the implied neutral (or natural, or medium-run 
                                                     
1 Grenville (1997) pointed out that the RBA started to focus internally on an inflation target by 
1991, however, the new regime and the target were not announced publicly until 1993. 
equilibrium) interest rate for each period? Finally, what was responsible for any 
observed asymmetric behaviour— asymmetric preferences or a non-linear 
supply relation? 
 We extend the forward-looking interest rate setting rule in a non-linear 
fashion by applying a threshold model representation. In devising a dummy 
variable to classify the two states of the business cycle, Bec, Salem and Collard 
(2002) used the sign of lagged output gap, where the current period is classified 
as an expansion (contraction) if the lagged output gap is positive (negative). 
Working with monthly data, these authors assumed that a monthly lag of the 
level of the output gap is a good indicator of the contemporaneous state of the 
business cycle. According to Debelle (1999), the RBA formulates current policy 
actions by considering the future business cycle in terms of expected output 
growth. Therefore we use changes in the output gap as a classification scheme to 
better capture this aspect of policymaking. 
The forward-looking non-linear monetary policy rule is estimated by the 
generalized method of moments (GMM), which exploits a set of orthogonality 
conditions based on the assumption that the monetary authority forms 
expectations rationally. Assuming the monetary authority is forward-looking, it 
must generate forecasts with the aid of information available at the time of 
setting the interest rate. The GMM estimation in this context is therefore built 
on a weak rational expectations hypothesis that the forecast errors are not 
systematically related to the information set used by the monetary authority. 
 We find significant evidence of asymmetric policymaking by the RBA in 
the post-float era. The form of the asymmetry, however, differed as the 
monetary policy framework moved from monetary aggregate targeting and the 
checklist approach in the 1980s into the current inflation targeting regime that 
began in the early 1990s. In the first period from 1984 to 1990, when inflation 
was relatively high, the estimation results suggest that the RBA adjusted the cash 
rate more aggressively during expansions than contractions to counter future 
expected inflation and output gaps. This result reflects the intensity with which 
the RBA fought to bring down inflation, which culminated in the high interest 
rate in the late 1980s that set the economy on its subsequent disinflation path. In 
the early 1990s, the RBA took the opportunity to lock in the low inflation 
environment by introducing first an implicit inflation target, and then an explicit 
one. We find that the pattern of asymmetric behaviour differed in the inflation 
targeting period, with the RBA responding asymmetrically to future expected 
output gaps only. Although the RBA’s explicit policy objective was an inflation 
target band of 2 to 3 percent, it was a medium-run consideration, and their 
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responses to deviations from that appeared to be symmetric. The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the RBA placed a greater weight on stabilizing output 
during contractions than expansions.2 Our asymmetry output-gap result 
demonstrates the degree of flexibility that can be and was exercised to attend to 
the real economy in the short run. This was consistent with the commentaries 
provided by some RBA officials (see Debelle (1999) and Stevens (2003, 2004)). 
From our asymmetric results, we deduce that the explanation was likely to be 
asymmetric preferences rather than a non-linear aggregate supply relation. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on monetary policy rules. Section 3 provides an estimable 
form of the non-linear monetary policy rule. In section 4 we briefly discuss the 
applicability of GMM to estimating forward-looking monetary policy rules. 
Section 5 describes the data used in the estimation, provides the GMM 
estimation results, and checks for possible problems with weak instruments. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1  A Linear Monetary Policy Rule 
In the context of the debate on rules versus discretion, Taylor (1993) advocated 
the embedding of a policy rule in the research on the conduct and design of 
monetary policy. Using the assumption that the operating instrument of 
monetary policy is the short-term interest rate, a simple feedback rule was 
proposed which calls for the interest rate to adjust in response to changes in the 
inflation rate and fluctuations in real output. The rule was of the form: 
 
*
1 1( )
T
t t ti i xβ π π γ− −= + − +                                                                         (1) 
 
where 1ti r π −= + , β > 0 and γ > 0. In this formulation, the target interest rate 
that the monetary authority controls is *ti , i  becomes the neutral nominal 
interest rate in medium-run equilibrium when inflation is on target and the 
                                                     
2 Employing a hyperbolic tangent smooth transition regression model and linex function to 
examine Australia during the inflation targeting period, Karagedikli and Lees (2004) drew a similar 
conclusion—a larger movement in the cash rate is associated with a negative output gap than with 
a positive output gap. 
output gap is zero, and r  is the neutral real interest rate3, πt−1 and πT are the 
current and (implicit or explicit) target inflation rates respectively, xt−1 denotes 
the output gap which is defined as *1 1t tx y y− −≡ − , where yt−1 is current output 
and y* is potential output that would arise if wages and prices were perfectly 
flexible.4 
According to (1) any positive deviation of the inflation rate from its target 
value prompts the monetary authority to raise the level of target interest rate 
more than one-for-one, that is by 1+β. This is necessary so that the real interest 
rate rises to curb economic activity when inflation increases. The feedback rule 
also stabilizes economic activity since the monetary authority increases the target 
interest rate when a positive output gap is observed.   
 In Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993), nine different multi-country 
econometric models using variants of the interest rate rule were compared on 
their performance in terms of output and price variability. There are three types 
of interest rate rules utilized in these models: interest rates responding to 
deviations of the money supply from some target; interest rates responding to 
deviations of the exchange rate from some target; and interest rates responding 
to weighted deviations of the inflation rate and real output from some target. In 
particular, the authors found that the interest rate rule focusing on inflation and 
real output movements delivers the smallest output and price variability. Further 
supporting the use of interest rate rule to describe the behaviour of the 
monetary authority, Taylor (1999a) informally chose 1+β = 1.5, 2r = , πT = 2, 
and two sub-cases of γ = 0.5 and γ = 1 for the policy rule to fit the actual 
interest rate time series.5 It was shown that the federal funds rate implied by (1) 
with the fixed weights from both sub-cases tracks its realized counterpart 
remarkably well over the period 1987-1997. 
 This simple and intuitive configuration of the interest rate rule is 
appealing to those studying the systematic behaviour of the monetary authority. 
                                                     
3 The ‘neutral’ interest rate is a concept that has been used increasingly by central bank officials. 
For example, see www.rba.gov.au/Education/UnderstandingStatistics/box_d_bu_0801_1.pdf. 
The idea is that at this interest rate inflation is stable and output is growing at a normal rate.  
4 We use t−1 values for observed inflation and output because almost all interest rate decisions will 
be made (and recorded at the end of period t) using t−1 information. 
5 The original assignment of the coefficient for the output gap in Taylor (1993) was γ = 0.5. 
Subsequent studies, such as Ball (1998), proposed that γ should be closer to 1 in order to achieve 
an efficient monetary policy rule, which is defined as having minimum output and inflation 
variances.  
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Indeed, since Taylor (1993) popularized the concept there has been much 
interest on the research of monetary policy rules for policy evaluation. However, 
the backward-looking Taylor rule does not capture the essential features of 
contemporary monetary policymaking. Most notably since the adoption of an 
inflation targeting regime by a number of central banks around the world 
starting in the early 1990s, the process of monetary policy decision-making is 
best characterized as forward-looking in nature.6 At the heart of the regime is 
the specification of a numerical inflation target, and in most cases, an explicit 
tolerance band around the inflation target. Meyer (2001) described the 
Australian regime as having an explicit inflation target with a dual mandate of 
maintaining price stability and full employment. More specifically, the mandate 
calls for the inflation to be managed between 2 and 3 percent ‘on average, over 
the cycle’ (Stevens (2003), p.20) which makes inflation targeting a medium-run 
objective. This recognizes that inflation is harder to control precisely in the 
short run, and attempts to do so may create unnecessary macroeconomic 
volatility. Therefore the short-run focus of the RBA is to stabilize the real side 
of the economy while allowing for temporary blips on the inflation radar 
(Stevens (2003)). Because of both uncertainty and the policy lag inherent in 
monetary policy design, monetary authorities invariably rely on forecasts of 
future economic condition for guidance in aligning the expected future inflation 
path with the target (see Svensson (1997) and Stevens (2004)). 
 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) generalized the baseline 
Taylor (1993) specification by incorporating forward-looking behaviour 
exhibited by the monetary authority. In their papers, the interest rate is set in 
response to future expected inflation deviation from the target value, as well as 
the contemporaneous output gap. In this paper we assume that the target 
interest rate in each period is a function of the expected future gaps in inflation 
from the target value and output from the trend value: 
 
* ( [ | ] ) [ | ]Tt t m t t n ti i E E xβ π π γ+ += + Λ − + Λ                                              (2) 
                                                     
6 The first country to adopt an explicit inflation target was New Zealand in 1989. Canada followed 
in 1991, the UK in 1992, Sweden and Australia in 1993, Finland in 1994, Spain in 1995 (both 
Finland and Spain terminated the policy in 1998 for the adoption of the Euro in 1999), the Czech 
Republic in 1997, Poland, Israel and Brazil in 1999, Switzerland, South Africa, Thailand, Hungary, 
Colombia and Korea in 2000, and Iceland, Norway and Mexico in 2001, and the Philippines and 
Peru in 2002. 
where E is the expectation operator and Λt represents the collection of 
information available to the monetary authority at the time of setting the interest 
rate. Hence E[πt+m|Λt] and E[xt+n|Λt] are forecasted values of inflation and 
output gap in periods t+m and t+n respectively which are based on the 
information set Λ in period t. This forward-looking specification nests the 
baseline Taylor specification as a special case. If either current inflation or a 
linear combination of lagged inflation and the current output gap are a sufficient 
predictor for future inflation, the forward-looking specification collapses to the 
baseline Taylor rule. It also extends in a realistic fashion the ability of the 
monetary authority to consider a broader array of information, beyond lagged 
inflation and output, to form beliefs about the future condition of the economy. 
 Neither the backward-looking nor the forward-looking version of the 
interest rate rule is able to capture the observed tendency of central banks to 
smooth changes in interest rates (for a survey of the issue, see Lowe and Ellis 
(1997)). English, Nelson and Sack (2003) offered two possible reasons for such 
behaviour. First, an inertial policy represents an optimal response to shocks. The 
slow adjustment of interest rates, through its influence on the expectations of 
future policy movements, prevents the policy-makers from suffering credibility 
losses from sudden and large policy reversals, thus delivering a more effective 
control over inflation and output. Battellino, Broadbent and Lowe (1997) 
extended this line of reasoning to the fear of disrupting capital markets 
associated with aggressive movements in the short-term interest rate. Second, 
interest rate smoothing is seen as a precautionary stance against uncertainty 
about the structure and parameters of the true macroeconomic model, or about 
the quality of contemporaneous data releases. Given the observed sluggish 
movements in the short-term interest rate controlled by the monetary authority, 
we allow for a first-order partial adjustment specification to capture possible 
inertia in monetary policy implementation: 
 
*
1(1 )t t t ti i iρ ρ ν−= − + +                                                                                (3) 
 
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that measures the degree of interest rate 
smoothing and νt is an exogenous random shock to the interest rate assumed to 
be identically and independently distributed.7 Under this partial adjustment 
                                                     
7 More generally the inertial movement of interest rate can be described by: 
( ) ( )* 11t t t ti i L iρ ρ ν−= − + +  
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scheme, the actual short-term interest rate it moves gradually towards the target 
interest rate *ti  by eliminating a fraction (1−ρ) of the gap between the two 
variables in each period. 
 Substitute the nominal target interest rate rule (2) into the partial 
adjustment mechanism (3) to yield the policy rule: 
 
1(1 ){ ( [ | ] ) [ | ]}
T
t t m t t n t t ti i E E x iρ β π π γ ρ ν+ + −= − + Λ − + Λ + +                   (4) 
 
where m, n > 0. 
 Assuming weak rational expectations (so that the central bank’s forecast 
errors are random), we replace the unobserved forecast variables in (4) with 
their realized values to obtain an estimable function: 
 
1(1 ){ ( ) }
T
t t m t n t ti i x iρ β π π γ ρ ε+ + −= − + − + + +                                      (5) 
 
where (1 ){ ( ( [ | ]) ( [ | )}t t m t m t t n t n t tE x E xε ρ β π β π γ ν+ + + += − − − Λ + − Λ + . 
 The residual term εt is a linear combination of the forecast errors of 
inflation and output gap and the exogenous disturbance νt. Let λt denote a 
vector of variables that is a subset of the monetary authority’s information set. 
Given the assumed rational expectations of the monetary authority, the 
implication is that the elements inside λt are uncorrelated with the forecast 
errors contained in εt. 
 
2.2  A Non-Linear Monetary Policy Rule 
The linear interest rate rule described in the previous section can be derived 
from an explicit theoretical foundation. For example, Svensson (1997, 1999), 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) showed 
that the monetary policy rule can be derived from the optimizing behaviour of a 
monetary authority that minimizes a quadratic loss function over the expected 
deviations of inflation and output in relation to their target and trend values 
                                                                                                                              
where ρ(L) = ρ1+ρ2L+…+ρnLn−1 and ρ ≡ Σρi. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) found that a 
second-order partial adjustment model fits the federal funds rate better. We find that a first-order 
model gives a satisfactory fit to the Australian cash rate. It can be derived by adding a cost of 
changing the rate in the central bank’s objective function. 
respectively. 8 Depending on the backward and forward nature of wage and price 
setting, and on the assumptions regarding the information available to the 
monetary authority, both the inflation and output gaps appear in the interest rate 
rule either as current terms or as expectations of future values. 
There have been two recent strands in the literature on monetary policy 
rules that seek to extend the traditional linear-quadratic model. In the first, the 
monetary authority has asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation and/or 
output, while in the second, the aggregate supply relation (Phillips curve) is non-
linear. 
2.2.1 Asymmetric Preferences 
The first extension relaxes the assumption of a quadratic loss function and 
instead adopts an asymmetric preference specification. This approach is related 
to the inflation bias issue raised by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983). There, the inflation bias arises because the monetary authority is 
assumed to have a twofold objective of price stability and employment, with the 
preferred level of employment above the natural level. With room to exercise 
discretionary power, policy-makers will try to create inflation surprises in order 
to push employment above its natural level towards the higher desired level. But 
rational economic agents understand the temptations faced by the monetary 
authority and correctly forecast inflation, which eventually neutralizes any effect 
of inflation on employment. As a consequence employment remains at its 
natural level in the medium run but monetary policy is subject to a suboptimal 
inflation bias. 
 Two decades later, some have questioned the relevance of the features 
in the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon papers that generate the inflation 
bias. Since the monetary authorities must realize the futility of expanding output 
by means of inflation surprises, according to McCallum (1995), they will 
normally refrain from such practices, even under discretion. Blinder (1998) 
argued that policy-makers at the Federal Reserve actually try to maintain 
employment at the natural level rather than above it. Using a simple theoretical 
framework, Cukierman (2000) demonstrated that even when policy-makers are 
assumed to target the natural level of employment, an inflation bias is still 
possible when the monetary authority is more concerned about under- than 
over-employment and there is uncertainty surrounding the future state of the 
                                                     
8 Ideally, the monetary authority should aim for economic efficiency rather than a fairer 
distribution, and thus maximize an objective aggregate function involving consumption and 
leisure. In practice, this is too difficult, and policy-makers are seen to short-circuit the problem by 
maximizing functions of key macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and output. 
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economy. For example, if there is some probability that an adverse supply shock 
will substantially reduce employment below its natural rate, economic agents will 
attach a greater likelihood to the monetary authority engaging in expansionary 
measures to reverse employment back to the target level. This leads to upward 
pressure on prices. Conversely, the monetary authority is assumed to take no 
action when a favourable supply shock pushes employment above the natural 
level. Similar conclusions were reached in Gerlach (2000) where the monetary 
authority has a greater aversion towards contraction than expansion if the 
policy-maker possesses an asymmetric preference. As well as looking at 
asymmetric preferences over output that delivers the same inflation bias as in 
Cukierman (2000), Nobay and Peel (2003) also examined the case of asymmetric 
preferences over inflation for comparison. They showed that an asymmetric 
preference towards the inflation target is likely to generate a ‘deflationary bias’, 
where the monetary authority is relatively more comfortable with a policy 
outcome that undershoots rather than overshoots its inflation target. This is 
consistent with the description in Mishkin and Posen (1997) about the 
behaviour of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England who display an 
asymmetric reaction to positive and negative deviations of inflation from its 
target rate. 
 There are a number of empirical studies that support the existence of 
asymmetry in the reaction function of monetary authorities. Dolado, Maria-
Dolores and Naveira (2000) examined an asymmetric policy rule that depends 
on the sign of the inflation gap for France, Germany, Spain, and the US after 
1980. The estimation results confirm that the Bundesbank, Bank of France, and 
the Federal Reserve respond more strongly to positive inflation deviations than 
negative inflation deviations, however, the same conclusion could not be 
extended to the Spanish experience.9 Gerlach (2000) concentrated on the 
asymmetry of output gap responses and finds that the Federal Reserve may have 
been more concerned about the negative rather than the positive output gaps in 
the pre-1980 period. Following the same asymmetric scheme, Bec, Salem and 
Collard (2002) focused on the post-1982 period for the US, Germany, and 
France. Generally, they found more aggressive behaviour towards inflation 
during expansions than contractions for the US and Germany. In addition, the 
Bundesbank placed a higher weight on output stabilization during expansions 
                                                     
9 The authors noted that the inflation figures from Spain during the sample period were below the 
target value. Therefore they estimated an alternative asymmetric reaction function that depends on 
the accelerations and decelerations of the price level rather than the inflation gap. However, the 
test for asymmetry in the policy rule was still rejected. 
than contractions which confirms its reputation for being inflation-averse.10 
Instead of relying on the sign of the output gap to determine asymmetry, Ruge-
Murcia (2002, 2004) used unemployment and found evidence in favour of non-
linear behaviour for central banks in the OECD and the G7 countries. 
2.2.2 Non-Linear Phillips Curves 
The second extension examines the convexity of the Phillips curve (for example, 
see Schaling (2004) and Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2005)). In 
particular, the difference between the actual and expected inflation is a convex 
function of the output gap which implies a non-linear aggregate supply relation. 
The theoretical underpinning of this specification relates to the traditional 
Keynesian assumption that nominal wages are flexible upwards but rigid 
downwards. This implies that an increase in unemployment will drive inflation 
down by much less when unemployment is high than when it is low. When the 
non-linear aggregate supply curve is combined with a standard quadratic loss 
function, the resultant optimal interest rate rule is also non-linear and suggests 
that the monetary authority will increase interest rate more forcefully when 
inflation is above the target than when inflation is below. Dolado, Maria-
Dolores and Naveira (2005) confirmed that there are non-linearities in the 
operating procedures of the five central banks under examination when setting 
the short-term interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy.11 
 Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2004) constructed a general 
model that incorporates asymmetric preferences of the monetary authority 
(using a linex function) and a particular non-linear aggregate supply curve. 
Applying the model to the US data, the source of the asymmetry was found to 
originate from the monetary authority responding differently to either positive 
or negative inflation gaps. Their results imply that the US monetary policy can 
be characterized by a non-linear policy rule due to asymmetric inflation 
preferences of the Federal Reserve after 1983, but that the rule was found to be 
linear prior to 1979. 
  
                                                     
10 The estimation result for France suggested that more attention was paid to fighting inflation 
during recessions than expansions. The authors concluded that this may be related to the 
“competitive disinflation” policy conducted by the successive French governments from 1983 to 
the mid-1990s. The policy was aimed at, despite its negative impact on employment, restoring the 
competitiveness of French exports and satisfying the Maastricht criteria imposed on France as a 
member of the European Monetary Union.  
11 The central banks are: Banque de France (France), Bundesbank (Germany), Banco de Espana 
(Spain), the Federal Reserve (US), and the European Central Bank. 
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3. The Non-Linear Monetary Policy Rule for Estimation 
 
We depart from the standard linear-quadratic framework and pursue the two 
possible extensions that the loss function of the monetary authority may be 
state-contingent on the business cycle, and that the Phillips curve may have a 
non-linear kink. In Appendix 1 and 2, we show how to derive the optimal 
interest rate rules for these two extensions.12 In the former case, the state 
contingency affects the response to both inflation and the output gap in the rule, 
whereas in the latter it only affects the inflation response. From these two 
extensions, we obtain the following general model to estimate and to test 
whether the monetary authority responds more (less) aggressively to inflation 
and/or output gaps depending on the state of the business cycle: 
( ){ } [ ]
( ){ } [ ]
*
0
0
      
      
t
t
t
T
e t m t e t n t x
T
r t m t r t n t x
i i
E E x I
E E x I
β π π γ
β π π γ
+ + ∆ >
+ + ∆ <
=
+  Λ  − +  Λ    
+  Λ  − +  Λ    
                               (6) 
 
where the subscripts e and r denote the expansionary and contractionary phases 
of the business cycle, and I[•] is the Heaviside function which is equal to unity 
when the condition in the associated brackets holds, and zero otherwise. The 
non-linear monetary policy rule (6) allows for changes in the behaviour of 
policy-makers when the economy moves from one state to another, where the 
specification hinges on the determination of a threshold value to separate the 
states. In Bec, Salem and Collard (2002), the business cycle phases were 
classified according to the sign of the output gap from period t−1. If the lagged 
output gap has a positive sign, the economy is deemed to be in expansion in the 
current period; and the economy is classified as in contraction in the current 
period if the sign of the lagged output gap is negative. This classification scheme 
may be unsuitable for the Australian monetary policy framework. As Debelle 
(1999) explained in his paper, the design of Australian monetary policy centres 
on the inflation target in the medium run, and so this approach allows for more 
                                                     
12 Our two extensions are designed to derive similar forms for the policy rule. We have also 
considered a non-linear Phillips curve as in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2005), where the 
function is smooth and convex. This yields an optimal policy rule with an additional cross-product 
term in inflation and the output gap. Preliminary tests indicated that this cross-product was 
insignificant. 
attention on the issue of output stabilization in the short run. With the purpose 
of illustrating the flexibility of the Australian framework, he cited three 
economic episodes that took place during the current inflation target regime.13 
In each instance, the RBA based their pre-emptive policy move on the expected 
future output growth and inflation movement. So the change in the output gap, 
i.e. ∆xt = xt−xt−1, equivalent to the gap between actual and ‘normal’ output 
growth, is used to classify the two states of the business cycle. We feel this 
indicator variable captures better the realistic manner in which the RBA views 
future business cycles. 
 Combining the state-contingent monetary policy reaction function (6) 
with the first-order partial adjustment scheme (3), and replacing the 
unobservable forecasts with actual future values yields: 
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(7) has an effective threshold value at ∆xt = 0. Empirically, such an 
event occurs with a probability of measure 0, and so ignoring it has no statistical 
consequences. Time periods that satisfy ∆xt > 0 are classified as expansionary 
phases of the business cycle. The sensitivity of the monetary authority towards 
future expected inflation and output gaps are measured by βe and γe respectively. 
Conversely, time periods that satisfy ∆xt < 0 are classified as contractionary 
phases. The monetary authority responds to future expected inflation and 
output gaps in this alternative regime with intensity βr and γr respectively. Note 
                                                     
13 The three economic episodes are: the interest rate tightening in 1994 due to the fear of the 
economy overheating; the interest rate easing in 1996 given the forecast of future inflation 
returning to the tolerance band of between 2 and 3 percent; and the neutral position taken by the 
RBA during the Asian financial crisis. 
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that if βe = βr and γe = γr the threshold specification (7) collapses back to the 
linear interest rate equation (5). 
 
 
4. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
Irrespective of whether the monetary authority is modelled to react 
symmetrically (2) or asymmetrically (6) towards future expected inflation and 
output gaps, the residual term εt is assumed to be orthogonal to the variables 
contained in the information set of the monetary authority at the time of setting 
the interest rate. This implies that the forecast errors of the monetary authority 
regarding future values of the inflation and output gaps are uncorrelated with 
the information that assist in the decision-making. Therefore this suggests a 
testable hypothesis of weak rational expectations on the part of the monetary 
authority: as long as a subset of the information actually used by the monetary 
authority is available to the econometrician, a set of orthogonality conditions 
can be constructed to form the centrepiece of the GMM estimation procedure. 
The seminal contribution to the GMM literature by Hansen (1982) offered an 
alternative principle for parameter estimation that requires the specification of 
moment conditions in contrast to specifying the full density as required under 
the principle of maximum likelihood—see Appendix 3 for further details. 
To apply the GMM methodology to forward-looking monetary policy 
rules, we first cast the estimation of the linear interest rate equation (5) in 
terms of Hansen’s (1982) formulation. Let [ , , , ]iθ β γ ρ ′≡  denote the 
unknown slope parameters and 1( , , , , )t t t t m t n tw i i xπ λ− + + ′ ′≡  denote the vector 
of variables for period t that are observed by the econometrician. Inside wt is 
the vector of instruments known at the time of setting the interest rate, i.e. λt 
∈ Λt. The rational expectations hypothesis postulates that the forecast error εt 
is orthogonal to any variable in λt. This naturally translates into a set of p 
orthogonality conditions: 
 
( ) ( ){ }11 0Tt t m t n t tE i i x iρ β π π γ ρ λ+ + − − − + − + − =                          (8) 
 
where the monetary authority’s inflation target is exogenously imposed. The 
slope coefficients θˆ  are obtained from the first-order condition (shown as 
(A3.4) in Appendix 3) and any over-identifying restrictions can be tested by the 
J-test (shown as (A3.5)). 
 Turning attention to the non-linear interest rate equation (7), the vector 
of coefficients to be estimated is denoted by [ , , , , , ]e r e riθ β β γ γ ρ≡ , and the 
observable random variables on date t denoted by wt is the same as in the linear 
case. Hence the set of p orthogonality conditions are represented by: 
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 The instrument set will contain variables that are helpful in forecasting 
future inflation and output gaps. When the model is over-identified, the GMM 
estimator is a two-step non-linear two-stage least squares estimator (Hansen 
(1982)). The set of instruments used in the estimation contains the following: 1 
to 4 lagged values of the four-quarter change in the logarithm of the trade-
weighted index exchange rate and the first-difference in the output gap; 2 to 5 
lagged values of the cash rate and the inflation rate; and 1 to 5 lagged values of 
the federal funds rate. 
 
5. Data and Empirical Results  
 
5.1  Data 
The estimation is conducted on quarterly data for the Australian economy that 
spans the period from 1984:1 to 2002:3, which coincides with the advent of the 
flexible exchange rate regime in December 1983. Basic statistics and graphs of 
the principal macroeconomic time series are presented in the Data Appendix. 
Given the assumption that the monetary policy instrument is a nominal short-
term interest rate, we use the 11am call rate of the inter-bank market or the cash 
rate, which is representative of the policy stance of the RBA. This was obtained 
from www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/OP10_update.xls. Inflation is based on the 
Australian Commonwealth Treasury underlying consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation rate spliced in September 1999 to the headline CPI. This was obtained 
from www.rba.gov.au/ Statistics/Bulletin/G01hist.xls. The temporary spike in 
the general price level that is linked to the introduction of the new general sales 
tax, or GST, in September 2000 is removed by taking 3 percent off the annual 
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inflation rate for the four affected quarters—September 2000 to June 2001. 
Potential output is obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the 
Australian real GDP (obtained from www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/G10 
hist.xls). The output gap is then computed as the difference between the 
logarithm of real GDP and its HP trend. The exchange rate is the nominal 
trade-weighted index (obtained from www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/F11 
hist.xls.) The federal funds rate was obtained from www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/ 
Bulletin/F13hist.xls. 
 We divide the sample into two main periods. The merit in breaking up 
the post-float sample period into two periods can be found in de Brouwer and 
Gilbert (2005), who evaluated the linear interest rate rule for Australia in both 
the backward-looking (1) and forward-looking (2) specifications before and after 
the inception of the inflation targeting regime. They consistently find a clear 
policy break represented by the disinflation at the start of the 1990s. During the 
first period between 1984:1 and 1990:4, the RBA operated with considerable 
discretionary power, while from 1991 it moved into the present relatively more 
rule-based inflation targeting regime. From 1977 to 1985, the RBA had a 
monetary targeting regime which set ‘conditional projections’ for the growth 
rate of M3, and the regime enjoyed limited success in reducing inflation.14 The 
practice of monetary targeting, however, was suspended in February 1985 as the 
medium-run relationship between money growth and inflation broke down due 
to the deregulation measures introduced from 1983. Instead, a checklist 
approach to monetary policymaking was installed while the RBA searched for a 
new prototype. The checklist included a wide-ranging and ad hoc mixture of 
factors that were conceivably relevant for framing monetary policy.15 The 
problem with this approach was that the RBA commanded a high degree of 
discretion, making it difficult for the private sector to form expectations about 
monetary policy, and possibly locking in an inflationary bias arising from time 
inconsistency. The comparatively high inflation rate in Australia in relation to 
the average inflation rate of the OECD countries during the second half of this 
period led the RBA to be increasingly concerned about the distortionary effects 
                                                     
14 In reality, however, monetary targeting was subordinated to the wages policy which was seen by 
the government to be the principal tool for achieving price stability (see Grenville (1997), pp. 129-
130). 
15 According to Johnston (1985, p. 812): ‘The relevant indicators include all the monetary 
aggregates; interest rates; the exchange rate; the external accounts; the current performance and 
outlook for the economy, including movements in asset prices, inflation, the outlook for inflation 
and market expectations about inflation’. 
of the high inflation rate on resource allocation and economic decision-making. 
Between 1987 and 1990, monetary policy was given a more active role in 
reducing the inflation rate with the cash rate reaching a peak above 18 percent in 
December 1989, which implied a high real interest rate of nearly 11 percent. By 
early 1990, inflation was on a downward path as a result of the recession 
induced by tight monetary policy (and fiscal policy) in the late 1980s. The RBA 
then sought to capitalize on this opportunity to achieve a permanent downward 
shift in inflation by developing a monetary policy regime that directly targeted 
medium-run inflation to lock in expectations and thus maintain low inflation. 
Following Grenville’s (1997) account, a natural point to commence the second 
period is 1991:1 when the regime shifted to focus on an inflation target. Initially 
the target was implicit, but by 1993, the policy was explicit. One of the 
highlights in this period was the low and stable inflation associated with one of 
the longest post-war expansions in Australia. In the next section we will present 
the empirical results from estimating a non-linear monetary policy rule for each 
period.  
 
5.2  Evidence of Asymmetric Monetary Policymaking in Australia 
Table 1 presents the estimated parameters of the non-linear monetary policy rule 
incorporating the smoothing mechanism from (7) with m = n = 1:16 
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 where we impose an additional restriction of a numerical value for the inflation 
target for each period to uncover an estimate for the neutral real interest rate r  
jointly with the parameter vector (βe, βr, γe, γr, ρ). Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1998) instead imposed exogenously the sample average real interest rate for r  
to obtain an estimate for πT.17 They additionally noted that if the monetary 
                                                     
16 A range of values for m and n was tested, and m = n = 1 was the only specification that 
generated sensible results on a consistent basis. 
17 They write the estimable linear forward-looking interest rate equation as: 
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authority is following the linear forward-looking monetary policy rule with the 
sample average real interest rate proxying for r , then the estimated value of πT 
is not expected to differ to a great extent from the sample average of π. By 
inserting an inflation target in (10), we can test whether the parameter estimate 
of the neutral real interest rate is statistically equal to the sample average real 
interest rate. If the test cannot reject equality between the two values, and 
assuming that the non-linear interest rate equation (10) gives an adequate 
description of the behaviour of the monetary authority, then the Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler observation suggests that the exogenously imposed πT should 
represent the implied target value that the RBA followed in that time period. 
A number of results in Table 1 can be highlighted before examining each 
period in more detail. First, the J-statistics from both periods indicate that the 
over-identifying restrictions are not rejected at the 5% significance level. 
Therefore the model specification is not rejected by the data. To further verify 
the model specification we test for serial correlation, ARCH, and non-normality. 
The diagnostic results reject non-normality, serial correlation and ARCH in the 
residuals. Second, the estimated coefficients of βe, βr, γe, γr, ρ and r  from both 
periods all possess their expected signs and are statistically significant with most 
p-values below 1% and only two at the 7% significance level. Finally, the 
estimate of the smoothing parameter ρ indicates an increasing degree of interest 
rate inertia over time: 53% (pre-inflation targeting) and 19% (with inflation 
targeting) of a change in the target interest rate is reflected in the cash rate 
within the quarter of the change. The dramatic increase in the degree of 
smoothing over time is a sign of the RBA’s increasingly cautious attitude to 
interest rate changes once it got inflation under control. Given the presence of 
long and uncertain policy lags, the observed inertia in cash rate movements may 
have helped to avoid costly policy reversals in the future which could have 
resulted in a potential loss of credibility.  
The primary question of this paper is whether the RBA considered 
inflation deviations from the target value and output gaps in upturns and 
                                                                                                                              
( )[ ] 11t t m t n t ti x iρ α βπ γ ρ ε+ + −= − + + + +  
where Tiα βπ≡ − . By using Ti r π= +  and therefore ( )1 Trα β π≡ + − , this implies that 
an estimate of the monetary authority’s inflation target can be recovered through 
( ) ( )/ 1T rπ α β= − −  by using the parameter estimates α and β, and r  proxied by the sample 
average real interest rate. 
downturns equally costly to the economy. We test for asymmetric responses 
using the Wald test on the inflation and output gap elasticities of the interest 
rate. The null hypothesis assumes respectively a symmetric response to the 
inflation gap (βe = βr) and the output gap (γe = γr) across the two states of the 
business cycle. 
 For the period between 1984:1 and 1990:4, the test results in the 
bottom panel of Table 1 reject both null hypotheses at the 1% significance level. 
The magnitudes of the parameter estimates suggest that the RBA reacted more 
aggressively towards both inflation and output gaps during upswings. In this 
first period, the policy framework shifted from a regime of monetary targeting 
to the checklist approach. At the start of this period Australia had witnessed a 
strong recovery coming out of the contraction of 1982, but because of the tight 
wages policy in place at the time, inflation fell sharply to a relatively low level at 
5% (down from 12% in 1982).18 With changes in inflation moderated by tight 
wages policy, the response of interest rates to the output gap needed to be much 
larger than the response to inflation. From 1985 Australia suffered from a 
gradual rise in inflation. Between February 1985 and October 1986, the 
exchange rate depreciated as a result of growing concerns about the current 
account deficit, thus driving up inflation, and then the interest rate. Between 
1987 and 1989 (after a cut in interest rates to compensate for the possible 
slowdown effects of the October 1987 stock market crash), the economy grew 
strongly, fuelled by an asset price boom. The fear of rising inflation led the RBA 
to raise the interest rate with a newfound determination, hoping to finally break 
the inflation psychology. This set in motion a painful disinflation episode that 
culminated in the recession of 1991.  
 
  Our GMM results for this period confirm the RBA’s efforts to contain 
output and inflation deviations throughout the 1980s. To recover an estimate 
for the ‘neutral’ real interest rate19, we impose an arbitrary inflation target of 
                                                     
18 The wages policy refers to the ‘Wages Pause’ introduced by the Fraser Government in 1982 and 
the subsequent centralized wage award system known as the Accords under the Hawke-Keating 
governments that was operational until the mid-1990s. 
19 Our estimate of the ‘neutral’ interest rate cannot be interpreted as an estimate of the medium-
run equilibrium value of that interest rate. Our data span in each period is too short, with too few 
business cycle phases, to be able to identify a medium-run equilibrium measure. 
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5.4%. We test the estimated coefficient 7.61%r =  and find that it is not 
statistically different (at 1%) from the sample average real interest rate (7.69%) 
for the first period. Provided the RBA was implicitly following the non-linear 
monetary policy rule in (10), we can infer that our assumed implicit inflation 
target of 5.4% for the period was a reasonable representation.20  
 Looking at the second period with the inflation targeting regime, the 
Wald test result shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of e rγ γ=  (at 2%) 
but not e rβ β= . This indicates asymmetric behaviour in the RBA’s policy 
response to output gaps only. In particular, the estimated coefficients γe < γr 
suggest that the RBA switched to attach a greater weight on output stabilization 
in contractions than in expansions. A similar conclusion was drawn in 
Karagedikli and Lees (2004), where a negative output gap elicits a larger 
movement in the cash rate than a positive output gap of the same magnitude 
from the RBA. As discussed before, the Australian monetary policy framework 
stipulates targeting inflation as a medium-run consideration. This allows for 
sufficient flexibility in the short run to focus more on output or employment 
fluctuations. It is consistent with our larger estimated values for γ than for β. 
The fact that we cannot reject symmetry in the policy response to inflation gaps 
confirms that an inflation target became the primary overall policy objective of 
the RBA, with deviations equally important in both upturns and downturns. 
However when the economy is in a downturn, our results suggest that the RBA 
almost doubled its short-run priority on output stabilization.  
The Asian financial crisis is an episode that can be used to illustrate this 
point. Before the onset of the crisis in the middle of 1997, Australia was 
growing relatively strongly with a widening current account deficit. The 
Australian dollar depreciated by around 20% reflecting the growing concerns 
about the deficit. Instead of responding to the usual fears of rising inflation 
expectations and future inflation brought about by the weakening Australian 
dollar, the RBA decided to leave the cash rate unchanged since the medium-run 
inflation target was not in jeopardy but the outlook on output growth was likely 
to be below trend. Indeed the RBA subsequently lowered the cash rate by 25 
basis points in late 1998. 
Given the RBA’s explicit inflation target band of 2 to 3 percent, we 
impose the midpoint 2.5% in Error! Reference source not found.. The 
estimate of the neutral real interest rate is 4.42%, and highly significant. We 
                                                     
20 de Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) chose to impose an inflation target of 4.7% for the 1980s. 
conduct a Wald test to see if the estimated neutral real interest rate is statistically 
equal to the average real interest rate for the period at 3.58% and the test reveals 
no significant difference. 
 To gain some feel for how well our asymmetric specification of the 
monetary policy rule is explaining the behaviour of the RBA, the two panels in 
Figure 1 show the actual, fitted, and residual series for the cash rate based on the 
GMM estimation reported in Table 1. In the first period, due to the instrument 
set using up to 5 lagged values, the in-sample forecasts only cover the period 
between 1985:2 and 1990:4. The predictions from the non-linear threshold 
model do not closely track the actual cash rate before 1988. This variance in 
performance of the model relates to the evolving state of the monetary policy 
regime, which exhibited considerable discretion with the “checklist” prior to 
1988. As the RBA progressively sharpened its focus on inflation, we observe 
that the increase in cash rate after 1989 is better predicted by the non-linear 
monetary policy rule. In the inflation targeting period from 1991, the fitted cash 
rate tracks the actual cash rate very closely.21 However, there are two notable 
unexplained outcomes that required dummy variables to obtain a statistically 
reasonable model over this period: 1. The rapid increase in cash rate at the end 
of 1994 (apparently due to a belief at the RBA that the early 1990s recession was 
truly over, and a global expansion was likely). 2. The reduction of the cash rate 
in response to the negative sentiments after the September 11 2001 bombings in 
the U.S. 
 
What do our results suggest for the two postulated sources of 
asymmetry—asymmetric preferences or a non-linear Phillips curve? For the first 
period, we could not reject asymmetry in the central bank’s response to both 
inflation and output. Given the implications (discussed at the beginning of 
section 3) of the two sources, asymmetric preferences is necessary to explain our 
first period results, while the non-linear Phillips curve might only have played a 
supporting role. For the second period, we detected asymmetry only with regard 
to the output gap. This is not possible with our non-linear Phillips curve, and so 
we conclude that asymmetric preferences provide a more likely explanation. 
 
5.3  Instrument Relevance 
The GMM estimation uses instruments to proxy for the two endogenous 
expectational variables, i.e. Etπt+1 and Etxt+1. If the instruments used in this 
                                                     
21 The adjusted measure of R2 increased from 0.25 in the first period to 0.97 in the second. 
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chapter are weak then inferences based on the GMM results are seriously 
undermined.22 The most common way to examine if the instruments are relevant 
is to check the R2 from the first stage regressions, and so we regress the two 
realized variables that replace the expectational variables, πt+1 and xt+1, on the list 
of instruments for each period: 
 
 1
1
t t t
x
t x t tx
π
ππ λ υ
λ υ
+
+
= Γ +
= Γ +                                                             
(11)
 
 
The first-stage F-test is a test that the coefficients on all the instruments 
are jointly zero in the regressions (11). In Table 2, we report the F-statistics and 
the associated p-values for each period. As can be seen, the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are jointly irrelevant is rejected in all four cases. The R2 from the 
first stage regressions are above 0.57. 
 
6  Conclusions 
The Australian monetary policy framework since financial market deregulation 
in the early 1980s can be characterized as an evolution, beginning with monetary 
aggregate targeting which was abandoned in 1985 because of the increasingly 
unstable relationship between money growth and inflation. A checklist approach 
was then installed while the RBA searched for an alternative framework. The 
RBA became increasingly focused on inflation as the principal medium-term 
policy objective. Its growing determination to beat inflation was evident in the 
high interest rates of the late 1980s. By 1991, the low inflation environment, 
engineered by that sharp disinflation, gave the RBA an opportunity to introduce 
the current inflation targeting regime. 
To motivate the policy rule used in this regime, the preferences of the 
monetary authority are usually approximated by a quadratic loss function in 
deviations of inflation and output from target values. In this manner, de 
Brouwer and Gilbert (2005) examined a forward-looking reaction function for 
the RBA and found that a linear policy rule appears to give a reasonable 
description of the conduct of monetary policy in Australia in the inflation 
targeting period. The implication of this linear rule, however, is that the RBA is 
assumed to have treated positive inflation and output deviations as distasteful as 
                                                     
22 See Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) for a recent survey paper on instrument irrelevance. 
the negative ones of the same magnitude. We have extended their analysis by 
testing whether the RBA responded in an asymmetric fashion to future expected 
inflation and output gaps depending on the state of the business cycle. An 
affirmative result for a non-linear policy rule would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that the RBA possessed an asymmetric preference function, and 
would mean that inferences drawn from linear symmetric preferences may not 
accurately reflect the reality of monetary policymaking. It could also be 
consistent with the existence of a non-linear Phillips curve. 
 We obtained GMM estimates of a non-linear forward-looking monetary 
policy rule for Australia during the post-float period. The results favour the 
hypothesis of asymmetric preferences of the RBA. The first period from 1984 to 
1990 featured high inflation rates, and the estimates suggest that the RBA 
reacted more aggressively towards both future expected inflation and output gaps 
during expansions than in contractions. In this first period, the RBA had not yet 
established credibility for its monetary policy design in the newly deregulated 
environment. Consequently, it needed particularly large interest rate responses 
to inflation and output gaps to have the desired effects. Thus the goodness-of-
fit of the estimated interest rate rule was unsurprisingly modest. 
With the successful disinflation at the end of the first period, the RBA 
gained credibility for its policy stance, and it chose to lock this in by developing 
an (eventually explicit) inflation targeting regime. Thus in the second period 
from 1991 to 2002, the estimated interest rate responses to the output gap was 
much smaller and the goodness-of-fit of the rule was much tighter, reflecting a 
payoff to enhanced credibility. Interestingly, the nature of the asymmetry 
changed in this second period.  
In this inflation targeting period, the RBA responded in an asymmetric 
manner with respect to only future expected output gaps, with the estimated 
coefficients indicating that the RBA switched to place a greater weight on 
stabilizing output during contractions than in expansions. This partial 
restoration of symmetry is consistent with the move to an explicit inflation 
targeting regime, for which deviations in either direction will be equally costly. 
The inflation symmetry result also supports the notion that the non-linear policy 
rule arose from asymmetric preferences rather than a non-linear Phillips curve.  
Our result that the RBA switched to respond more acutely to output in 
downturns is another positive pay-off from the credibility acquired with its 
inflation targeting regime. With inflation low and in check, the RBA has been 
more able to use monetary policy to stabilize the business cycle of output, 
particularly in downturns. Its enhanced credibility through anchored inflation 
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expectations meant that it needed to worry much less about the inflationary 
consequences of boom conditions. With the policy objective successfully 
revolving around an explicit inflation target band of 2 to 3 percent, as a 
medium-run consideration, our results demonstrate the degree of flexibility that 
the RBA has apparently given itself to attend to the real economy, which is 
consistent with the descriptions provided by some RBA officials (see Debelle 
(1999) and Stevens (2003, 2004)). 
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 Table 1: GMM Estimates of the Non-Linear Monetary Policy Rule 
Error! Reference source not found. 
 r  ρ βe γe βr γr 
1984:1~1990:4 7.61 0.47 0.57 2.44 0.26 1.79 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1991:1~2002:3 4.42 0.81 0.47 0.93 0.30 1.77 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
       
        
 r =sample 
mean 
βe = βr γe = γr J-statistic Q-statistic 
(4 lags) 
LM-
statistic 
(4 lags) 
Normality- 
statistic 
1984:1~1990:4 F(1,17) F(1,17) F(1,17) χ2(15) χ2(4) χ2(4) χ2(2) 
Sample r = 7.69 0.14 97 18 8.26 6.94 6.79 1.58 
 (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) (0.14) (0.14) (0.45) 
1991:1~2002:3 F(1,38) F(1,38) F(1,38) χ2(12) χ2(4) χ2(4) χ2(2) 
Sample r = 3.58 2.64 1.51 5.73 7.20 0.27 4.18 0.80 
 (0.11) (0.23) (0.02) (0.84) (0.99) (0.38) (0.67) 
 
Notes: P-values are reported in parentheses. The set of instruments includes: cash rate (-2 to -5), federal funds 
rate (-1 to -5), rate of change in the trade-weighted index (-1 to -4), change in the output gap (-1 to -4), and 
inflation (-2 to -5). The GMM estimation is carried out using EViews 5.0 with the Bartlett kernel and the 
Newey and West (1987b) fixed bandwidth of q = 2 for the first sample and the Newey and West (1994) 
variable bandwidth of q = 5 for the second. In the first sample, prewhitening of the moments was required. In 
the second, dummies had to be introduced for the sudden rise in the cash rate at the end of 1994, and for the 
sudden fall after the September 2001 quarter. The Q-statistic is the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation, the LM 
statistic is the test for ARCH, and the Normality statistic is the Jarque-Bera test. 
 
 
Table 2: Results from the F-Tests 
 πt+1  xt+1 
 F(21,2) Adjusted R2  F(21,25) Adjusted R2 
 (p-value)   (p-vlaue)  
1984:1~1990:4 1593 0.98  74 0.57 
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
      
1991:1~2002:3 260 0.99  14 0.85 
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
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Figure 1a: Actual, Fitted, and Residual of the Cash Rate 1985:2~1990:4 
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Figure 1b: Actual, Fitted, and Residual of the Cash Rate 1991:1~2002:3 
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Appendix 1 
Deriving the Optimal Interest Rate Rule with Asymmetric Preferences 
The monetary authority is assumed to manage monetary policy through the use of an interest rate 
setting rule. In period t, the monetary authority commits to a state contingent sequence of short-term 
interest rates that minimize an asymmetric intertemporal loss function: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]2 22 20 0
0
1 1
2 2
T T
t t e t t r tx xE x I x I
τ
τ τ τ τ
τ
δ π π ω π π ω∞ + + + +∆ > ∆ <
=
    − + + − +        ∑  (A1.1) 
subject to 
 1 1t t t txπ π α µ+ += + +  (A1.2) 
 ( )1 0 1 2 1 1t t t t tx x iϕ ϕ ϕ π η+ − += + − − +  (A1.3) 
where Et is the conditional expectations operator and δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The 
coefficients are expected to satisfy α, ϕ0, ϕ2 > 0, and ϕ1 ∈ (0,1). µt+1 and ηt+1 are zero mean normally 
distributed disturbances to inflation and output gap, respectively. (A1.2) specifies an aggregate supply 
relation where the first-difference in inflation depends positively on lagged output gap. The aggregate 
demand is described by (A1.3) where output gap exhibits sluggish adjustment and depends negatively 
on the real interest rate. We assume that private sector expectations are (believed to be) well-
explained by lagged inflation. Since the real interest rate affects output with a one-period lag, it 
therefore affects inflation with a two-period lag. 
 To derive the first-order condition, Svensson (1997, Appendix B) showed that it is useful to 
study a related two-stage problem. First, choose xt and πt to minimize: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
( )}
2 22 2
0 0
1
1 1
2 2
                
T T
t t e t t r tx x
t t
V x I x I
EV
π π π ω π π ω
δ π
∆ > ∆ <
+
    = − + + − +       
+
 (A1.4) 
subject to (A1.2). Next, substitute in the optimal values of xt and πt into the aggregate demand 
relation (A1.3) to determine the implied value of it.  
 Given the asymmetric preferences of the monetary authority, the first-stage minimization is 
performed with respect to the two output gap variables for the expansionary and contractionary 
phases of the business cycle, i.e. xtI[∆x>0] and xtI[∆x<0]. 
 Before deriving the first-order conditions, we predict the indirect loss function V(πt) to be 
quadratic and dependent on the phases of the business cycle: 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]2 20 0 01 12 2T Tt e t r tx xV k k I k Iπ π π π π∆ > ∆ ≤= + − + −  (A1.5) 
where the coefficients k0, ke, and kr are to be determined later. 
Hence, the first-order conditions are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 10 0
1 10 0
0
0
T
e t t t e t e t tx x
T
r t t t r t r t tx x
x E V I x k E I
x E V I x k E I
π
π
ω δ α π ω δα π π
ω δ α π ω δα π π
+ +∆ > ∆ >
+ +∆ < ∆ <
 + = + − =    
 + = + − =    
 (A1.6) 
where Vπ(.) = ∂V(.)/∂π. 
 To identify k0, ke, and kr we exploit the envelope theorem for (A1.4) and (A1.5): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]
1 0
1 0                 
T T
t t e t t x
T T
t r t t x
V k E I
k E I
π π π π δ π π
π π δ π π
+ ∆ >
+ ∆ <
 = − + − 
 + − + − 
 (A1.7) 
 Rearranging the first order conditions (A1.6) and using 1t t t tE xπ π α+ = +  we get: 
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[ ] ( ) [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ]
0 02
0 02
Te
t tx x
e e
Tr
t tx x
r r
kx I I
k
kx I I
k
δα π πω δα
δα π πω δα
∆ > ∆ >
∆ < ∆ <
= − −+
= − −+
 (A1.8) 
 Next we substitute out Etπt+1 in (A1.7) and use (A1.8) to obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
02
02
1
                 1
Te e
t t x
e e
Tr r
t x
r r
kV I
k
k I
k
π
δωπ π πω δα
δω π πω δα
∆ >
∆ <
  = + −  +  
  + + −  +  
 (A1.9) 
 Given that ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]0 0T Tt e t r tx xV k I k Iπ π π π π π∆ > ∆ <= − + − , the identification of k0, ke, 
and kr is achieved by matching up the coefficients: 
 
0
2
0
1 ,   ,j jj
j j
k
k
k j e r
k
δω
ω δα
=
= + =+
 (A1.10) 
 There is a unique positive solution each for ke and kr that can be solved analytically from the 
resulting quadratic: 
 
( ) ( ) 2
2 2 2
1 1 41 1 1 1,    ,
2
j j j
jk j e r
ω δ ω δ ω
δα δα α
 − −  = − + + + ≥ =     
 (A1.11) 
 Given these results, we reformulate the constrained minimization of (A1.4) subject to (A1.2) 
to derive an optimal asymmetric monetary policy rule: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ] ( )
2 2
1 1 1 0
2 2
1 1 1 20
1
2
1                   
2
T
t t t t e t t x
T
t t r t t t t tx
V E E E x I
E E x I EV E
π π π ω
π π ω δ π
+ + + ∆ >
+ + + +∆ <
  = − +   
 + − + +    
 (A1.12) 
subject to 
 1 2 1 1t t t tE xπ π α+ + + += +   
where [ ]1 0t t xE x I+ ∆ >  and [ ]1 0t t xE x I+ ∆ <  are regarded as the control variables. 
 Analogous to (A1.6), the first order conditions we obtain can be written as: 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ]
1 20 0
1 20 0
Te
t t t tx x
e
Tr
t t t tx x
r
kE x I E I
kE x I E I
δα π πω
δα π πω
+ +∆ > ∆ >
+ +∆ < ∆ <
= − −
= − −
 (A1.13) 
 From the aggregate demand relation (A1.3), the implied optimal interest rate *ti  is 
 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ] [ ]( )
* 0 1
1 1
2 2 2
0 1
1 10 0 0 0
2 2 2
1
1
t t t t t
t t t t t tx x x x
i E x x
E x I E x I x I x I
ϕ ϕπ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
− +
+ +∆ > ∆ < ∆ > ∆ <
− = − +
= − + + +
  
Substituting (A1.13) into this and grouping like terms, yields the optimal asymmetric monetary 
policy rule: 
  19
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]
2
* 0
1 1 1 1 0
2 2 2
2
1 1 1 0
2 2
1
          1
Te e
t t t t t t x
e e
Tr r
t t t t x
r r
k ki E E x I
k kE E x I
ϕ δα δαπ ϕ π πϕ ω ϕ ω ϕ
δα δαϕ π πω ϕ ω ϕ
− + + ∆ >
+ + ∆ <
 = + + − − +  
 + − − +  
  
which can be rewritten as: 
 
 
( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
*
1 1 1 0
1 1 0              
T
t t e t t e t t x
T
r t t r t t x
i r E E x I
E E x I
π β π π γ
β π π γ
− + + ∆ >
+ + ∆ <
 = + + − + 
 + − +                                                   
(A1.14) 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Deriving the Optimal Monetary Policy Rule with a Non-Linear Phillips Curve  
In period t, the monetary authority is assumed to choose the path of the interest rate that minimizes 
the expected present discounted value of the following symmetric intertemporal loss function: 
 ( )2 2
0
1
2
T
t t tE x
τ
τ τ
τ
δ π π ω∞ + +
=
 − +  ∑  (A2.1) 
subject to the following two equations describing the evolution of the economy: 
 ( )1 1t t t tf xπ π µ+ += + +  (A2.2) 
with 
 ( ) 0
0
e t t
t
r t t
x if x
f x
x if x
α
α
∆ >=  ∆ <
 (A2.3) 
where 
0
'
0
e t
r t
if x
f
if x
α
α
∆ >=  ∆ <
 
and 
 ( )1 0 1 2 1 1t t t t tx x iϕ ϕ ϕ π η+ − += + − − +  (A2.4) 
where the coefficients are expected to satisfy αe > αr > 0, ϕ0,ϕ2 > 0, and ϕ1 ∈ (0,1). The source of 
asymmetry in the optimal monetary policy rule comes from (A2.2), which can be interpreted as a 
kinked Phillips curve (or aggregate supply relation). Inflation changes depend on the output gap in a 
non-linear way, as defined in (A2.3), where linearity is recovered when αe=αr. When output is 
growing, unemployment will be falling and so wage and price inflation will be rising. However when 
output growth is negative, the downward pressure on wages and prices will be muted by downward 
inflexibility or hysteresis effects. 
 Consider two adjacent periods, τ +1 and τ+2 in the dynamic optimization problem: 
 
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2... [( ) ] [( ) )]..2 2
t t
T T
t t t tE E x E E x
τ τ
τ τ τ τ
δ δπ π ω π π ω
+ − + −
+ + + +− + + − +   
 Substitute out for Etxτ+1, Etxτ+2, and Etπτ+2 by using (A2.2)-(A2.4), and then minimize with 
respect to iτ to give: 
 ( )1 1 2 2' 0Tt t tE x E x f Eτ τ τω ωδϕ δ π π+ + ++ + − =   
 Replacing Etxτ+2 in terms of Etxτ+1, Etiτ+1, and Etπτ+1 using (A2.4) gives: 
 ( ) 20 11 2 1
2 1 2 1 2
1T
t t t
fE i E E xτ τ τ τ
ϕ δϕπ π πϕ δωϕ ϕ δϕ ϕ+ + +
′ += + + − +   
 Iterating this back to t gives the implied optimal short-term interest rate, *ti : 
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 ( ) 2* 0 11 1
2 1 2 1 2
1T
t t t t t
fi E xϕ δϕπ π πϕ ωϕ ϕ δϕ ϕ− +
′ += + + − +    
 Recalling (A2.3), this can be rewritten as: 
 
( ){ } [ ]
( ){ } [ ]
*
1 1 0
1 0                  
t
t
T
t t e t t x
T
r t t tx
i r E I
E I x
π β π π
β π π γ
− + ∆ >
+ ∆ <
= + +  Λ  − 
+  Λ  − + 
 (A2.5)   
 We obtain a modified Taylor rule (A2.5) which differs from the conventional linear 
specification (for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000)) because it includes a kink due to f′ 
from (A2.3) which operates only on the gap between expected inflation and the target. Given αe > αr 
> 0 and thus βe > βr > 0, if inflation is expected to be higher than the target, the central bank will raise 
the cash rate more when output growth is greater than normal (∆xt >0) than when less (∆xt < 0). This 
interaction effect does not operate on the central bank’s response to the output gap. 
Appendix 3 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimation Procedure 
Let wt denote the (k×1) vector of variables observed at date t, and let θ be the (a×1) parameter vector 
of interest. Define h(θ, wt) as a (p×1) vector of moments which is a stationary process, with p ≥ a. The 
vector of moments is assumed to satisfy a set of p orthogonality conditions when θ is equal to its true 
value of θ0: 
 ( )0, 0tE h w =  θ  (A3.1) 
 Given a sample of size T, we stack up all of the observations into a (Tk×1) vector, 
1 1( , , , )t T Tu w w w−′ ′ ′ ′≡ K , and thus define the sample average of h(θ, wt) as: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1, ,
T
t t
t
g u h w
T
θ θ
=
 ≡   ∑   
 The GMM estimator θˆ  is chosen to make the sample moment g(θ, ut) as close as possible to 
the population moment of zero in (A3.1). This translates into a minimization problem of the 
following objective function with respect to θ: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )min   , , ,t t T tQ u g u W g uθ θ θ θ′=         (A3.2) 
where 1{ }T TW
∞
=  is a sequence of (p×p) positive definite weighting matrices which may be dependent 
on the data ut.  
 Let Ω be the covariance matrix of h(θ0, wt) which is given by: 
 ( ) ( )0 0, ,t t j
j
E h w h wθ θ∞ −
=−∞
 ′ Ω =       ∑   
 If the vector process 0{ ( , )}t th wθ ∞=−∞  was serially uncorrelated, the efficient GMM estimator 
θˆ  chooses Ωˆ  so that it converges in probability to the asymptotic covariance matrix: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 ˆ ˆˆ , ,
T
p
t t
t
h w h w
T
θ θ
=
′     Ω = →Ω      ∑  (A3.3) 
 In another words, the GMM estimator θˆ  achieves minimum variance when the optimal 
value for the weighting matrix WT in (A3.2) is given by the inverse of the covariance matrix 1ˆ −Ω . 
 Therefore the first-order condition of the minimization problem described by (A3.2) is a 
system of non-linear equations: 
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 ( ) ( )1
ˆ
, ˆˆ , 0t t
g u
g u
θ θ
θ θθ
−
=
′ ∂   ×Ω × =   ′∂  
 (A3.4) 
where ˆ[ ( , ) / ] |tg u θ θθ θ =′∂ ∂  denotes the (p×a) matrix of derivatives of the function ( , )tg uθ  with 
the derivatives evaluated at the GMM estimate θˆ . 
 Hansen (1982) showed that, under general conditions, the GMM estimator θˆ  is 
T consistent and asymptotically normal. Therefore the asymptotic variance of θˆ  is 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
ˆ ˆ
, ,ˆ ˆt tg u g uV
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
−
−
= =
 ′   ∂ ∂    = Ω    ′ ′∂ ∂        
  
 The objective function (A3.2), when evaluated at the estimated parameter vector and suitably 
normalized by the sample size, is asymptotically chi-squared: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2ˆ ˆˆ, , Lt tJ T g u T g u p aθ θ χ−′   ≡ ⋅ Ω ⋅ → −      (A3.5) 
 This is a specification test suggested by Hansen (1982) when the model is over-identified—
i.e. the number of orthogonality conditions exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated (p > 
a). Also known as the “J-test” in the literature, it tests for the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions, with the null hypothesis that all restrictions imposed on the model are satisfied. 
A two-stage estimation is carried out given its superior performance in small samples. In the 
first stage, an initial estimate (0)θˆ  is obtained by minimizing (A3.2) with an identity matrix WT = Ip. 
The initial estimated coefficient vector is then inserted in (A3.3) to form an initial estimate (0)Ωˆ . In 
the second stage, (A3.2) is minimized with (0) 1ˆ[ ]TW
−= Ω  to arrive at a new coefficient estimate 
(1)θˆ , and which is then put back into (A3.3) to obtain a new estimate (1)Ωˆ . Simultaneously updating 
of the coefficients and weighting matrix at each iteration continues until both converge, i.e. 
( ) ( 1)ˆ ˆj jθ θ +≅  and ( ) ( 1)ˆ ˆj j+Ω ≅ Ω . To make sure the weighting matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation, the Bartlett kernel (Newey and West (1987a)) is used to weight the covariance 
matrix Ω in the second stage. The optimal weighting matrix is thus constructed to be 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC): 
 ( ) ( )0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,
q
HAC j j
j
k j q
=
′Ω = Γ + Γ −Γ∑  (A3.6) 
where ( ) ( )
1
1 ˆ ˆˆ , ,
T
j t t j
t j
h w h w
T
θ θ −
= +
′     Γ =        ∑ .  
Both the Newey and West (1987b) parametric (applied to the first sample) and the Newey and 
West (1994) nonparametric (applied to the second sample) methods are employed to select the 
bandwidth of the kernel, k(j,q), which is used to weight the covariances so that ˆ HACΩ  is ensured to 
be positive semi-definite. Inside the kernel, the bandwidth q needs to be chosen which determines 
how the weights given by the kernel change with lags in the estimation of ˆ HACΩ . 
 
 
 
  22
 Data Appendix 
 
Descriptive Statistics 1984Q1 – 1990Q4 1991Q1 – 2002Q3 
Cash Rate        Mean 14.83 6.07 
SD 2.57 1.65 
Inflation         Mean 7.14 2.49 
SD 1.53 0.72 
Output Gap      Mean 0.50 -0.26 
SD 1.17 0.86 
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